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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we assess the ability of time-varying VAR models to
correctly diagnose the source of ‘Great Moderations’ generated in
simulations of a learning model. We find that, in general, they can. For
example, in data sets with Great Moderations generated by good policy,
the VAR correctly identifies a downward shift in the policy disturbance.
And it shows that if the policy behaviour associated with the latter part of
the sample (during which policy is conducted well) are applied to the
earlier part of the sample, the implied variances of output, inflation and
interest rates would have been much lower. An important caveat to our
results is that they appear to be sensitive to the method used to
identification of monetary policy shocks. When we identify monetary
policy shocks using a Cholesky decomposition, the VAR provides quite
clear evidence in favour of the correct explanation for our simulated Great
Moderations When sign restrictions are used to identify the monetary
policy shocks, conclusions from the counterfactual experiments are less
precise. The contrast between our results and previous work based on
Monte Carlo evidence using RE models suggests that the ability of VARs
to correctly diagnose the source of the Great Moderation may be
dependent on the nature of the expectations-formation process in the
private sector.
* This paper is preliminary and incomplete .please do not quote without the authors.permission. The
views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Bank of England.1 Introduction
One of the starkest empirical facts in macroeconomics is the dramatic nature of the changes
in the time series properties of in￿ ation and real activity since the 1970s. Most industrialised
countries experienced a ￿ Great In￿ ation￿period of high and volatile in￿ ation during the 1970s,
followed by a ￿ Great Moderation￿in volatilities to a period of low and stable in￿ ation that has
been dubbed the ￿ Great Stability￿in studies of the UK data.1 These changes in the level and
volatility of in￿ ation were, in many countries, accompanied by changes in its persistence. And
similar patterns have also been observed in measures of real activity such as GDP. Figure 1
documents these facts for the United Kingdom.2
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Unsurprisingly these facts have spawned a huge literature investigating the possible causes
of the changes in the time series of macroeconomic data.3 Broadly speaking, the literature has
sought to identify the relative contribution of three factors: good luck; favourable structural
change; and better policy. The ￿ good luck￿explanation is simply that the shocks hitting
economies in recent decades may have been smaller and less volatile than the shocks hitting
those economies in the 1970s and early 1980s.4 Favourable structural change ￿for example,
1See, for example, Bernanke (20 Feb 2004) for the United States, or King (2007) for the United Kingdom.
2In￿ ation data is based on the RPI measure prior to 1976, when it is spliced to the RPIX series. Output
is GDP at market prices. Standard deviations and persistence (sum of ￿rst four autocorrelation coe¢ cients)
are based on rolling samples of 40 quarters.
3This literature is surveyed by Velde (2004). But some notable contributions are: Stock & Watson (2002),
Cogley & Sargent (2005), Cogley & Sargent (2002).
4Policymakers themselves recognise that good luck may have played a part in the Great Moderation.
2greater competition in goods and factor markets ￿could have reduced the extent to which
the macroeconomy is sensitive to shocks of a given variance. And improved frameworks for
and conduct of monetary and ￿scal policies may have allowed policymakers to respond more
e⁄ectively to stabilise the economy in the face of the shocks hitting it.
This paper is concerned with the extent to which econometric investigations may confuse
changes in the expectations process (associated with improvements in monetary policy) with
changes to the process driving macroeconomic shocks. Such confusion might lead researchers
to falsely conclude that good luck is the primary explanation of the Great Moderation. This
conjecture is not new. As Bernanke (2004) noted:
... changes in monetary policy could conceivably a⁄ect the size and frequency of
shocks hitting the economy, at least as an econometrician would measure those
shocks. This assertion seems odd at ￿rst, as we are used to thinking of shocks
as exogenous events, arising from ￿outside the model,￿ so to speak. However,
econometricians typically do not measure shocks directly but instead infer them
from movements in macroeconomic variables that they cannot otherwise explain.
Shocks in this sense may certainly re￿ ect the monetary regime.
Some have interpreted Bernanke￿ s conjecture in terms of a change in the monetary policy
reaction function from one that responded ￿ too weakly￿to in￿ ationary pressures in the 1970s
and early 1980s to one that was much more responsive thereafter.5 The ideas is that a
policy response to in￿ ation that is ￿ too weak￿can give rise to multiple equilibria in rational
expectations models: the equilibrium paths for in￿ ation and activity are ￿ indeterminate￿ . In
such cases, in￿ ation and activity can be driven by so-called sunspot shocks that are unrelated
to the fundamental disturbances to demand and supply. When monetary policy becomes
more responsive to in￿ ation, the equilibrium paths of in￿ ation and real activity are uniquely
determined and the e⁄ects of sunspot shocks are eliminated. Benati & Surico (2006) generate
data from simulations in which monetary policy behaviour exogenously changes from a reaction
function that generates indeterminate equilibria to one that ensures a unique determinate
equilibrium. They then ask whether an econometrician would correctly diagnose the source
of their simulated Great Moderations. They ￿nd that standard econometric approaches would
tend to diagnose ￿ good luck￿instead of correctly diagnosing ￿ good policy￿since the change in
monetary policy regime alters the transmission mechanism of shocks.
Bernanke (2004) and King (2005) are explicit about this. The issue is how much of a contribution this has
made.
5Subsample estimates of monetary policy reaction functions by [Clarida et al] suggest that the responsiveness
of nominal interest rates to in￿ ation increased in the 1980s and 1990s. The study of [Lubik and Schorfeide]
found similar results when estimating a small New Keynesian model over subsamples of US data.
3In this paper, we also use simulated data to test whether econometricians can correctly
diagnose the cause of changes in their time series properties. But our simulated data are
generated from a model characterised by private sector learning. This model captures the idea
that changes in monetary policy behaviour can change the properties of the economy through
the expectations formation process when those expectations are not formed rationally. Non-
rational expectations may be seen as both emprically plausible and useful when thinking about
monetary policy. Indeed, Bernanke (2007) himself argues that ￿many of the most interesting
issues in contemporary monetary theory require an analytical framework that involves learning
by private agents and possibly the central bank as well￿ .
Several recent papers have also examined the extent to which econometric techniques are
able to uncover changes in the time series properties of data that are generated by non-rational
expectations models. Perhaps the closest exercise to ours is that of Milani (2007). Milani￿ s
interpretation of Bernanke￿ s conjecture in very similar to ours. Milani studies how data
generated by a model of adaptive learning would be interpreted by an empirical model that
was agnostic about expectations. Our exercise di⁄ers from his in two respects. Our model
of learning is less sophisticated. Milani includes endogenously time-varying gain to capture
the idea that the amount by which agents discount past data will depend on their view of
the usefulness of that data for predicting the future. Our empirical strategy is, however, a
little more advanced. While Milani looks for whether the econometrician will detect spurious
ARCH/GARCH e⁄ects in the volatility of shocks to regression equations linking in￿ ation and
the output gap to a constant and one lag, the VARs we estimate incorporate time-variation in
both the propagation parameters and the shock variances. We also identify monetary policy
shocks from the other shocks.
Brazier et al. (2008) illustrate how endogenous changes in expectations-formation can alter
the in￿ ation process such that an econometrician will interpret these switches as ￿ uctuations
in the volatility of shocks to in￿ ation, even though the underlying volatility of shocks is no
di⁄erent. They suppose that the econometrician runs very simple autoregressions for in￿ ation.
Aoki & Kimura (2008) study how a model of two-way learning between the private sector
and the central bank could account for the Great Moderation. He notes how the resolution,
through learning, of uncertainty about private sector perceptions of the in￿ ation target by the
central bank, and uncertainty about the in￿ ation target by the private sector can lead to a
reduction in the estimated persistence of in￿ ation as measured by simple autoregressions for
in￿ ation.
Our paper proceeds in three steps. First, we set out out a simple New Keynesian model
of the economy in which agents￿expectations are formed by ￿ constant gain￿learning about
the structure of the economy. This speci￿cation means that agents discount past data more
4heavily than if they made use of the entire history of data. Putting a relatively high weight
on recent data makes sense if the correlation and persistence properties of the variables in
the economy change over time ￿as is the case in Great Moderation episodes. We simulate
the model many times under each of two scenarios. In the ￿ good luck￿scenario, we reduce
the variance of the shocks to demand and pricing at the midpoint of the sample, which
proxies a reduction in the variance of the shocks hitting the economy. In the ￿ good policy￿
scenario, we reduce the variance of shocks to the monetary policy rule at the midpoint of
the sample, proxying an improvement in monetary policy behaviour (fewer shocks to interest
rate setting). Both scenarios induce changes in the time series properties of output, interest
rates and in￿ ation, which agents learn about gradually over time. We describe the model and
simulation output in Section 2.
Second, we describe the econometric tools that we will use. We use a time-varying VAR
framework to diagnose the causes of the observed changes in the time series properties of a data
set. The time-varying VAR approach permits both the coe¢ cient matrices and the covariances
of the innovations to evolve (as random walks) over time. We use two alternative assumptions
to identify the shocks to the VAR that provide alternative (estimated) separations of monetary
policy and other shocks. The ￿rst identi￿cation assumption is a standard ordering assumption
(Cholesky decomposition) and the second is based on sign restrictions on the impulse response
functions. The setup of the VAR is described in detail in Section 3.
The third step is to confront the time-varying VAR approach with the data generated by the
learning model: we do this in Section 4. The question we pose is whether an econometrician
confronted with data from the ￿ good luck￿and ￿ good policy￿scenarios and armed with the
time-varying VAR technology would be able to correctly identify the sources of the changes in
the time series properties of the data. To do so we estimate VAR models on many data sets
produced by each scenario. We then analyse the properties of the shock processes that we
identify and the impulse responses of the VAR with respect to those shocks. We also conduct
counterfactual experiments as follows. We split each sample and impose the properties of
certain shocks in the second (more stable) subsample on the ￿rst (less stable) subsample. So
for example, we can impose the properties of the identi￿ed monetary policy shocks from the
second subsample on the ￿rst to see what would have happened in the ￿rst subsample under the
assumption that monetary policy shocks had the same properties as in the second subsample
If the ￿rst subsample looks very di⁄erent when the policy shocks from the second subsample
are applied, then this can be interpreted as evidence that ￿ good policy￿was the driver of the
change in time series properties. Similarly, we can impose the properties of the non-policy
shocks from the second subsample on the ￿rst to examine the ￿ good luck￿explanation These
experiments mirror those performed on actual UK data by Benati & Mumtaz (2006).
5Our results suggest that the e⁄ects of better monetary policy on expectations can be
correctly identi￿ed as ￿ good policy￿ by a time-varying VAR approach, when expectations
formation is described by adaptive learning. These results contrast with those of Benati
& Surico (2006), who ￿nd that, time-varying VARs are unable to correctly identify ￿ good
policy￿in data generated by a rational expectations model under the assumption that policy
changes from using an ￿ indeterminate￿policy rule to using a ￿ determinate￿rule. This suggests
that the ability or otherwise of time-varying VARs to identify the contributions to the Great
Moderation depends on the nature of the expectations and learning processes that characterise
private sector behaviour.
In Section [x] we conclude by asking how one should we read our results in light of the
fact that studies using time-varying parameter VARS on actual data tend to diagnose Great
Moderations as being generated by good luck We argue that one interpretation is that our
results lead us to put less weight on Bernanke￿ s scepticism about the ability of empirical
tools to correctly diagnose the Great Moderations caused by good policy. We ￿nd that
appropriately identi￿ed time-varying parameter VARs are able to correctly uncover the true
source of Great Moderations simulated from a model in which policy-induced changes in
expectations formation are important. But we also argue that our ￿ndings may lead us to
put less weight on the notion that the Great Moderation can be explained using a simple
model with adaptive learning: our model is perhaps too stylised to replicate the patterns in
time series data that characterise the Great Moderations we observe in actual macroeconomic
data. And given the extreme ￿ exibility of the time-varying parameter VAR, our Monte Carlo
experiments may not provide a stern enough test of the technique. It must surely remain a
possibility that good luck played a role in the Great Stability. The Governor of the Bank of
England himself acknowledged that "Lady Luck smiled on us" in producing what he called
the NICE (non-in￿ ationary-continuously-expanding) decade of the 1990s. But how much this
was a factor is an open question.
2 An adaptive learning model for simulating Great Mod-
erations
2.1 The model
We simulate Great Moderations using a New Keynesian model modi￿ed so that expectations
are formed by constant gain, adaptive learning. Since the model has been discussed and
motivated exhaustively elsewhere, our discussion here is extremely brief. Linearized versions
of the model￿ s three equations, with all variables expressed as log deviations from steady state,
6comprise an in￿ ation equation; an aggregate demand or IS equation; and a policy rule.
￿t ￿ ￿￿t￿1 = ￿Et [￿t+1 ￿ ￿￿t] + ￿xt + "￿;t; (1)
Note that our in￿ ation equation includes a term in lagged in￿ ation. This term can be
justi￿ed by the assumption that price setting is governed by a Calvo (1983) contracting scheme
and that ￿rms that do not reoptimise their prices index them to an average of lagged in￿ ation
(with weight ￿) and trend in￿ ation.6 We set this weight to be 0.1, since we are including
other sources of persistence, via the shocks, and via learning.
xt = Etxt+1 ￿ ￿
￿1(irt ￿ Et￿t+1) + "x;t; (2)
irt = ’￿￿t + ’xxt + "ir;t; (3)
Policy is therefore set using a Taylor rule. We set the output gap coe¢ cient to be 0.5 and
the in￿ ation coe¢ cient to be 1.5. These coe¢ cients are familiar benchmark values and help
to ensure stability in our model.
We assume that our shocks follow persistent processes:
"￿;t = ￿￿"￿;t￿1 + ￿z￿z￿;t (4)
"x;t = ￿x"x;t￿1 + ￿zxzx;t (5)
"ir;t = ￿ir"ir;t￿1 + ￿zirzir;t (6)











and we assume that agents form their expectations by projecting from past values, thus:
Et(Yt) = ￿tYt￿1
Agents￿forecasting coe¢ cients are updated each period according to the following recur-
sion:
￿t = ￿t￿1 + ￿R
￿1
t (Y ￿ ￿t￿1Yt￿1)
Rt = Rt￿1 + ￿(Rt￿1 ￿ Yt￿1Y
0
t￿1)
Note that here we are simply substituting out for terms in EtYt using agents￿VAR-based
forecasts. Preston (2005) refers to this as the ￿ Euler equation￿approach to learning models,
6See [Woodford].
7and notes that it arguably does some violence to the underlying microfoundations of the
model. We side-step the issue in the hope that this approach nevertheless provides an adequate
approximation to the behaviour that would characterise a sticky-price learning model.7











In common with other researchers using learning models of this type, we are forced to use
what is known as a ￿ projection facility￿to guarantee stability of our learning model. Our
facility is one that allows agents to use the updated forecast coe¢ cients provided that the
modulus of the maximum eigenvalue of ￿t is less than unity. If this condition fails, agents
are assumed to carry forward last period￿ s forecast coe¢ cients to this period. This facility is
not itself enough to guarantee that the model is stable. But, together with our calibration of
the gain at 0.03 ￿a value comparable to that used by other researchers in this literature ￿it
ensures that explosive simulations are relatively rare.
2.2 Designing ￿ better policy￿and ￿ good luck￿induced Great Mod-
erations
We simulate two sets of 1000 Great Moderations, one that are brought about by events that we
characterise as ￿ better policy￿ , the second brought about by ￿ good luck￿ . For each simulation,
we simulate the model for 1000 periods, and then extract the ￿nal 160 periods.8 We think
of our model as a quarterly model, so 160 periods is meant to match the roughly 40 years
7There is a debate about the importance of this simpli￿cation. [Harrison and Taylor] compare the behaviour
of a simple New Keynesian model with non-rational expectations solved using the Euler equation approach
and Preston￿ s ￿ long horizon expectations￿method. They ￿nd that the models behave quite similarly as long
as the deviation from rational expectations is relatively small.
8Prior to the 1000 periods of model simulation, we ￿ burned in￿the shocks for 3000 periods to eliminate
pseudo-randomness in these draws.
8of post-war history that are focused on in studies of the Great Moderation, with the ￿rst 20
being characterised by a ￿ Great Immoderation￿and the ￿nal 20 featuring an improvement of
one sort or other. To construct our ￿ good luck￿Great Moderations, after period 80 we halve
the variance of the shocks to the in￿ ation and aggregate demand equations from 0.2 to 0.1.
Our ￿ better policy￿simulations are based on cutting the variance of the shocks to the monetary
policy equation from 0.2 in the ￿rst 80 periods, to 0 in the ￿nal 80 periods.
Table 1: Properties of the DGP
Subsample 1 Subsample 2
Median lower upper Median lower upper
DGP with change in the volatility of the monetary policy shock
Standard deviation
In￿ ation 0.23 0.20 0.27 0.22 0.19 0.26
Output Gap 0.28 0.23 0.34 0.23 0.20 0.26
Interest Rate 0.39 0.34 0.47 0.32 0.28 0.38
AR1 Coe¢ cient
In￿ ation 0.61 0.48 0.72 0.56 0.42 0.69
Output Gap 0.67 0.52 0.77 0.54 0.41 0.65
Interest Rate 0.55 0.37 0.69 0.50 0.35 0.66
DGP with change in the volatility of the non-policy shocks
Standard deviation
In￿ ation 0.35 0.27 0.50 0.18 0.14 0.25
Output Gap 0.29 0.24 0.36 0.15 0.13 0.19
Interest Rate 0.54 0.43 0.75 0.32 0.26 0.41
AR1 Coe¢ cient
In￿ ation 0.77 0.65 0.87 0.76 0.65 0.86
Output Gap 0.67 0.55 0.77 0.65 0.55 0.75
Interest Rate 0.69 0.53 0.84 0.55 0.33 0.73
Table 1 presents some basic statistics calculated using the two DGP￿ s across the two
subsamples. The estimated standard deviation of the endogeneous variables is lower in the
second subsample with this di⁄erence greater in the dataset generated under the good luck
hypothesis. There is little evidence for a change in persistence as measured by the AR(1)
coe¢ cient.
93 Monte Carlo experiments
In this section we explain the Monte Carlo experiments that we perform. In Section 3.1 we
brie￿ y outline the key elements of the experiment design, before outlining the speci￿cation
and estimation of the time-varying VAR model in Section 3.2. We explain the ￿ counterfactual￿
simulations in Section 3.3.
3.1 Experiment design
The design of the Monte Carlo experiments is based on the following three steps:
Step 1. Use the model in equations (1) to (3) as the data generating process and simulate two
data-sets from the model under di⁄erent assumptions about the change in policy and
non-policy shocks (as described in Section 2.2).
Step 2. Estimate a time-varying VAR with stochastic volatility using each dataset and con-
duct counterfactual experiments to determine the source of any estimated change in the
volatility of the endogenous variables.
Step 3. Repeat the above 500 times
3.2 The time-varying VAR: speci￿cation and estimation
We estimate a time-varying VAR(1) (TVP-VAR) with stochastic volatility using each of the
generated datasets. The choice of the TVP-VAR as an empirical approximation of the data
re￿ ects that fact that (a) it has been the model of choice in several recent studies on the great
moderation (see for e.g. Cogley & Sargent (2005) and Primiceri (2005)) and (b) that it is
a ￿ exible device to model time-variation in the dynamics and volatilities incorporated in the
DGP.
Speci￿cally, we estimate the following time-varying parameter VAR:
Zt = ￿t +
L X
l=1
￿l;tZt￿l + vt (7)
where Z contains generated data on in￿ ation, output and the interest rate. We ￿x the lag
length L=1. The parameters of the model ￿t = f￿t;￿l;tg evolve as random walks
￿t = ￿t￿1 + ￿t
The covariance matrix of the innovations vt is factored as


























with the hi;t evolving as geometric random walks,
lnhi;t = lnhi;t￿1 + ￿t
Following Primiceri (2005) we postulate the non-zero and non-one elements of the matrix
At to evolve as driftless random walks,
￿t = ￿t￿1 + ￿t , (10)
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The model in equations 7 to 11 is estimated using Bayesian methods. A detailed description
of the prior distributions and the sampling method is given in Appendix A. Here we summarise
the basic algorithm which involves the following steps:
1. Use the ￿rst 30 observations in the sample to set priors and starting values9.
2. Conditional on a draw for the VAR coe¢ cients ￿t, sample the VAR covariance matrix.
This involves the following draws:
￿ The o⁄-diagonal elements of the covariance matrix ￿t are simulated by using the
multi-move Gibbs sampler in Carter & Kohn (2004)
￿ The volatilities of the reduced form shocks Ht are drawn using the Metropolis-
Hastings scheme introduced in Jacquier et al. (2004).
3. Conditional on the draw for Ht and ￿t draw the VAR coe¢ cients ￿t: This is carried
using the methods in Carter & Kohn (2004).
9This implies that the e⁄ective sample (used for estimation) consists of 130 periods with a structural break
imposed in period 50.
114. Conditional on the draw for Ht, ￿t and ￿t draw the hyperparameters Q;S and G from
their respective distributions.
5. Go to step 2.
We take 20000 draws from these conditional posterior distributions and retain the last
1000 draws for inference. This choice of the total number of draws is dictated primarily by the
need to keep the monte-carlo experiment computationally tractable. Using code written in the
OXTM programming language, 20000 draws from the posterior are obtained in approximately
25 minutes implying that one set of monte carlo experiments (with 500 replications) takes
about 10 days to complete.
3.2.1 Identifying monetary policy shocks
We identify monetary policy shocks based on two identi￿cation schemes. Firstly, as in Prim-
iceri (2005) we use a Choleski decomposition of ￿t with the interest rate ordered last. Secondly,
following Benati (n.d.) we use sign restrictions to identify the monetary policy shock. Our
identi￿cation strategy imposes the restriction that the contemporaneous impact of the mon-
etary policy shock be non-negative on the interest rate and non-positive on in￿ ation. In
selecting this ￿ agnostic￿identi￿cation strategy we follow Uhlig (2005). In addition, the ag-
nostic nature of the identi￿cation scheme substantially reduces the computational burden10.
This identi￿cation scheme is implemented as follows. We compute the time-varying structural
impact matrix, A0;t, via the procedure recently introduced by Rubio et al. (2005). Speci￿-
cally, let ￿t =PtDtP 0
t be the eigenvalue-eigenvector decomposition of the VAR￿ s time-varying
covariance matrix ￿t, and let ~ A0;t ￿ PtD
1
2
t : We draw an N ￿ N matrix K from the N(0;1)
distribution. We take the QR decomposition of K. That is we compute Q and R such that
K = QR: We then compute a candidate structural impact matrix as A0;t = ~ A0;t ￿ Q0: If A0;t
satis￿es the sign restrictions we keep it. Otherwise we draw another matrix K and recompute
A0;t:
3.3 Outline of the counterfactual experiments
We evaluate the performance of the TVP-VAR in two ways. Firstly, we assess if the parameter
estimates accurately re￿ ect the changes in the dynamics and the volatility of the endogenous
10In particular, we found it very di¢ cult to impose a contemporaneous fall in both the output gap and
in￿ ation (in response to an increase in interest rates) in the second half of the sample with the algorithm
repeatedly getting stuck for a long period of time.
12variables built in to the DGP. Secondly, we investigate if we can accurately identify the mon-
etary policy shock and correctly infer its importance in bringing about any estimated changes
in dynamics or volatilities. Re￿ ecting the methods adopted in Primiceri (2005), Sims & Zha
(2006) and Benati (n.d.) we carry out this second exercise through counter-factual exper-
iments. In particular, we identify the monetary policy shock in the estimated TVP-VAR.
We then impose the volatility of the monetary policy shock and parameters of the interest
rate equations estimated in the second half of the sample on the ￿rst half of the sample.
This counterfactual sequence of VAR parameters and shock volatilities is used to re-estimate
the unconditional volatility of in￿ ation, the output gap and the interest rate. This is then
compared to the actual estimates of these volatilities to gauge if the TVP-VAR can correctly
identify the source of the structural change. For example, when data is generated under the
good policy scenario and if the change in the volatility of the policy shocks is accurately cap-
tured by the TVP-VAR, then we would expect the counterfactual estimate of the variance of
in￿ ation, output gap and the interest rate to be substantially below the actual estimate.
4 Results
This section presents the main results from our Monte Carlo experiments. We describe the
results using data from simulations in which Great Moderations are generated by improvements
in monetary policy in Section 4.1. Then in Section 4.2 we describe the results using data from
simulations in which Great Moderations are generated by good luck. Each of these sections
begins by describing the properties of the posterior estimates, before moving on to discuss the
structural
4.1 Detecting ￿ Great Moderations￿generated by good policy
4.1.1 A summary of the posterior
Here we describe our estimates of volatility and persistence obtained using the estimated TVP-
VAR. Note that the ￿gures below present the distribution of these moments obtained across
the 500 replications. In other words, we save the median estimate for each estimate of the
TVP-VAR and present the median and the 90% con￿dence interval estimated over the 500
Monte Carlo replications.
The top 3 panels of ￿gure 1 presents the estimates for the elements of Ht (see equation
9). There is little change in the volatility of the shock to the output and in￿ ation equation.
In contrast, there is strong evidence of a decrease in the volatility of the shock to the interest
rate equation after period 50, with the estimated volatility close to zero. The top right panel
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Figure 1: Estimated volatility for Great Moderations generated by good policy
14presents the estimated prediction variance. This is de￿ned as lndet(￿t) and measures the
total shock variation in the VAR system. The results suggest a sharp decline in the total
prediction variance after period 50. The bottom panel of the ￿gure presents the estimates of
the unconditional volatility of each variable. We approximate the unconditional volatility as
R
$ ftjT(!), where the spectrum ftjT(!) is calculated as









where I3 denotes a 3￿3 identity matrix , s is a selection vector that picks out the coe¢ cients
associated with the ith variable in the VAR and $ denotes the frequency. The estimated
unconditional volatility of all three variables declined after period 50. Note, however that
the estimated con￿dence intervals are quite wide possibly indicating that the evidence on the
decline of volatility provided by the TVP-VAR is not clear cut. This is, however, consistent
with the fact that the degree of the reduction in volatility seen in this DGP is relatively small
(see table 1).
Figure 2 presents the estimated normalised spectral density of each variable at $ = 0:
We de￿ne the normalised spectrum as
ftjT(!) R
$ ftjT(!) and use this as a measure of persistence (see
for e.g. Cogley & Sargent (2005) ). Figure 2 suggests some evidence for a change in the
persistence of in￿ ation and the output gap with the spectral density lower after period 50.
4.1.2 Structural estimates
Figure 3 plots the estimated standard deviation of the monetary policy shock obtained using












where A0 denotes the structural impact matrix obtained using either the Choleski decomposi-
tion or the sign restrictions algorithm of Rubio et al. (2005) and s denotes a selection vector.
Figure 3 suggests two interesting conclusions. First, regardless of the identi￿cation scheme
used, the TVP-VAR correctly identi￿es a fall in the volatility of the monetary policy shock
after period 50. However, the degree of reduction in the standard deviation of monetary policy
shocks is smaller when sign restrictions are used to identify the shock. Secondly, the standard
deviation of the monetary policy shock is substantially smaller (in the ￿rst 50 periods) when
the sign restriction scheme is used. This suggests that the role played by the monetary pol-
icy shock may potentially be under-estimated when sign restrictions are used to identify the
shock.
Figure 4 plots the estimated median time-varying impulse response functions with the top
panel displaying the estimates under recursive identi￿cation and the bottom panel displays




























Figure 2: Estimated spectrum at frequency zero for Great Moderations generated by good
policy
















Figure 3: Estimates of standard deviation of the monetary policy shock for simulated Great










































































































































Figure 4: Impulse response to a monetary policy shock for simulations of Great Moderations
generated by good policy
18those obtained under the sign restriction scheme. Both estimates share one feature: the magni-
tude of the response of the output gap and in￿ ation depends entirely on the magnitude of the
monetary policy shock with little evidence of variation in the transmission mechanism. How-
ever in their other features the responses are starkly di⁄erent. Under the Cholesky scheme, a
contractionary policy shock decreases in￿ ation and output. Under sign restrictions, the in￿ a-
tion response displays a price puzzle in the second subsample. Similarly, the response of the
output gap is positive in the second sub-sample. These anomalies suggest that the minimal
restrictions incorporated in this scheme may not be enough to correctly identify the monetary
policy shock in this setting.
4.1.3 Counterfactual experiments
Counterfactual experiments form a key piece of evidence in several recent papers that deal with
the great moderation (see for e.g. Primiceri (2005), Sims & Zha (2006) and Benati (n.d.)).
In our Monte Carlo experiment we further analyse the ability of the TVP-VAR to diagnose
the causes of the great moderation by investigating the performance of two counterfactual
experiments.
Under the ￿rst experiment, we impose the elements of the monetary policy rule estimated
after period 50 over the entire sample. In other words, we combine the coe¢ cients of the
monetary policy equation and the volatility of the monetary policy shock from the ￿good
policy period￿ with the estimated non-policy blocks of the TVP-VAR coe¢ cients and the
covariance matrix. We refer to the ￿rst experiment as the policy counterfactual. In the
second experiment we combine the non-policy shocks from the second sub-sample (i.e. after
period 50) with the estimated policy block of the VAR. We refer to this experiment as the
non-policy counterfactual.
In both cases we use these counterfactual sequence of VAR parameters and shocks to
re-estimate the unconditional volatility of the three endogenous variables. We then compare
these counterfactual estimates with those presented in the bottom panel of ￿gure 1. We report
results for the both counterfactual experiments under each of our identi￿cation schemes.
In practical terms, the counterfactual experiments involve the following steps for each
Monte Carlo replication
1. For Gibbs iteration i, divide the sequence of drawn ￿t;At and Ht into the two subsamples
S1 and S2 ( where the second subsample S2 starts after period 50). Take a random
draw from the sequences ￿t;At and Ht from S2. Call these ~ ￿; ~ A and ~ H.
2. Construct the covariance matrix ~ ￿ using ~ A and ~ H and then ￿nd the structural impact
matrix ~ A0 using either the Choleski decomposition or the sign identi￿cation. Use this
19to calculate the variance of the structural shocks as ~ H￿ = ~ A
￿10
0 ~ ￿ ~ A
￿1
0 where ~ H￿ is a 3￿3
diagonal matrix with the variance of monetary policy shock as the last element.
3. Using the structural impact matrix A0;t obtained at each date t, estimate the volatility






4a. In the ￿rst counterfactual experiment construct a new sequence of the VAR covariance
matrix ￿ ￿t by replacing the last element of H￿
t with the last element of ~ H￿ (this forces
the volatility of the monetary policy shock to equal the estimate in S2) and combining
with A0;t: In addition, replace the coe¢ cients of the interest rate equation in ￿t with
those from ~ ￿: Call this counterfactual sequence of VAR coe¢ cients ￿ ￿t:
4b. In the second counterfactual experiment construct a new sequence of the VAR covariance
matrix ￿ ￿t by replacing the ￿rst two element of H￿
t with the ￿rst two element of ~ H￿ (this
forces the volatility of the non-policy shock to equal the estimate in S2) and combining
with A0;t:
5. Using ￿ ￿t and ￿ ￿t (for experiment 1) construct the spectral density using equation 12 and
estimate the unconditional volatility.
6. Repeat for Gibbs iteration i=1...100.
Counterfactual experiments using Cholesky identi￿cation Figure 5 presents results
for the policy counterfactual using the Choleski decomposition to obtain A0;t and ~ A0. The
black lines in the top three panels represent the estimated unconditional standard deviation
(also shown in ￿gure 1). The blue and the red lines represent the distribution of the uncondi-
tional volatility under the assumption that the elements of the monetary policy rule estimated
after period 50 prevail over the entire sample. It is clear from these ￿gures that under this
counterfactual assumption, the median estimate of volatility is substantially lower in the ￿rst
50 periods and remains ￿ at over the sample period. This suggests that in this experiment the
TVC-VAR correctly assigns the cause of the great moderation to a change in the elements of
the monetary policy rule. The bottom panel of the ￿gure tries to assess the signi￿cance of the
di⁄erence in the counterfactual and actual estimate of the unconditional volatility. In partic-
ular, it shows the estimated mean probability that the counterfactual estimate of volatility is
less than the actual estimate. This probability is close to 90% for all three variables in the
￿rst 50 periods of the counterfactual experiments and then drops to around 50% over the rest
of the sample. Therefore, there is a high probability that the TVC-VAR correctly diagnoses
the cause of the great moderation in this experimental setting.























































































































































Estimate of unconditional volatility based on VAR estimates
Counterfactual estimates of unconditional volatility
90% confidence band
Figure 5: Policy counterfactual (Choleski identi￿cation; data generated by good policy)

























































































































































Figure 6: Non-policy counterfactual (Choleski decomposition; data generated by good policy)
























































































































































Figure 7: Policy counterfactual (sign identi￿cation; data generated by good policy)
Figure 6 shows the results for the non-policy counterfactual using the Choleski identi￿cation
scheme. The ￿gure suggests that if the volatility of the non-policy shocks estimated after
period 50 is imposed on the sample, there is very little change in the estimated volatility of
the endogenous variables. The probability that the counterfactual estimate of volatility is less
than the actual estimate is substantially lower than that depicted in ￿gure 5.
Counterfactual experiments using sign restriction identi￿cation Figure 7 presents
the estimates for the policy counterfactual when the sign identi￿cation scheme is used. In
contrast to Choleski identi￿cation (see 5), the results are far less clear. Although the median
counterfactual estimates of volatility are lower than the actual ones, the di⁄erence is smaller
in magnitude and the estimated probabilities shown in the bottom panel are only around 70%
in the ￿rst half of the sample.
Figure 8 presents results from the non-policy counterfactual when sign restrictions are used
to identify the shocks. The counterfactual estimates are quite close to the actual estimate of
unconditional volatility. Therefore as with the Choleski scheme, the TVC-VAR does not lead
to an overestimate of the importance of non-policy shocks.































































































































































Figure 8: Non-policy counterfactual (sign restrictions; data generated by good policy)
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Figure 9: Estimated volatility for Great Moderations generated by good luck
4.2 Detecting ￿ Great Moderations￿generated by good luck
4.2.1 A summary of the posterior
Figure 9 plots the estimated stochastic volatility (top panels) and the unconditional volatility.
The estimates indicate a change in the volatility of the orthogonalised shocks to the in￿ ation
and output equation with the volatility falling after period 50. In contrast the shock to the
interest rate equation shows little change in its volatility. The bottom panel of the ￿gure
shows the unconditional volatility is estimated to decline for all three variables.
Figure 9 shows that the TVC-VAR produces little evidence to support that the persistence
of the endogenous variables has changed. This is in line with the simple AR(1) coe¢ cients
reported in Table 1.
4.2.2 Structural results
In this subsection we present results based on the structural version of the TVC-VAR. As
before, we identify the shocks based on a Choleski decomposition and on sign restrictions.
Figure 11 displays the standard deviation of the monetary policy shock obtained using the
two identi￿cation schemes. The two estimates display little time-variation and this feature


























Figure 10: Normalised spectrum at frequency zero for Great Moderations generated by good
luck


















Figure 11: Estimates of standard deviation of the monetary policy shock for simulated Great















































































































































Figure 12: Impulse Responses to a monetary policy shocks
is consistent with the DGP. However as in the previous experiment (see ￿gure 3) the sign
identi￿cation scheme produces a substantially smaller estimated for the standard deviation
of the monetary policy shock suggesting again that this identi￿cation scheme assigns a less
important role to the policy shock.
Figure 12 presents the responses to a monetary policy shock under both identi￿cation
scheme. The Choleski decomposition scheme produces a large price puzzle with in￿ ation
positive for one period after the shock. The response of output under the sign restriction
scheme is positive. Note also that the responses under the sign restriction scheme suggest a
dampening of the transmission mechanism, with the in￿ ation and output response become
weaker towards the end of the sample period. In summary, the impulse response functions
from the two identi￿cation schemes are quite unclear and contradictory suggesting that the
TVC-VAR is unable to provide a clear picture of time-varying structural dynamics in this
DGP.






















































































































































Figure 13: Policy counterfactual (Choleski identi￿cation; data generated by good luck)
4.2.3 Counterfactual experiments
Counterfactual experiments using Cholesky identi￿cation In this section we again
assess the ability of the TVC-VAR to diagnose the factors behind the structural change im-
posed in this DGP.
The top panels of ￿gure 13 present the estimates of the policy counterfactual (the uncondi-
tional volatility calculated under the assumption that the elements of the policy rule estimated
after period 50 prevails over the entire sample). The ￿gure shows that the counterfactual es-
timates (blue lines) are virtually indistinguishable from the actual estimate (black line). The
bottom panels show the probability that the counterfactual estimate is less than the actual
estimate hovers around 0.5.
The results for the non-policy counterfactual in ￿gure 14 are quite di⁄erent. This ￿gure
presents results from the counterfactual experiment where the volatility of non-policy shocks
estimated after period 50 are imposed over the entire sample. The counterfactual estimates of
volatility are lower than the actual estimates suggesting that the TVC-VAR correctly assigns
the structural break to non-policy shocks. This observation is further re-enforced by the fact
that the estimated probability shown in the bottom panel is around 90% before period 50.




























































































































































Figure 14: Non-policy counterfactual (Choleski decomposition; data generated by good luck)



























































































































































Figure 15: Policy counterfactual (sign identi￿cation; data generated by good luck)
Counterfactual experiments using sign restriction identi￿cation Figures 15 and 16
present the results from the counterfactual experiments using the sign identi￿cation scheme.
The results point to the same conclusions as the Choleski identi￿cation. When the volatility
of the policy shocks estimated after period 50 is imposed over the entire sample, the resulting
estimate of unconditional volatility is little di⁄erent from the ctual estimate. In contrast, when
the volatility of ￿ good￿non-policy shocks is imposed over the entire sample, the counterfactual
volatility estimates are lower than actual estimates. Note, however, that under the sign
identi￿cation scheme the results are less precise. In particular, in the non-policy counterfactual
, the probability that the counterfactual volatility is lower than actual volatility is only around
70% in the ￿rst half of the sample. This suggests that there is some non-trivial probability
that the TVC-VAR (with sign restrictions) erroneously assigns importance to structural shifts
in the volatility of policy shocks.
4.3 Summary and discussion of the results
Table [x] below, summarises some of the information contained in the lower panels of Figures
5￿ 8 and 13￿ 16.





























































































































































Figure 16: Non-policy counterfactual (sign identi￿cation; data generated by good luck)
32Great Moderations generated by:
Good policy Good luck
Detection probabilities Detection probabilities
Counterfactual Identi￿cation Variable Subsample 1 Subsample 2 Subsample 1 Subsample 2
Policy Cholesky In￿ ation 0.92 0.46 0.63 0.50
Output gap 0.96 0.47 0.63 0.50
Interest rate 0.89 0.49 0.46 0.49
Sign In￿ ation 0.66 0.46 0.49 0.49
Output gap 0.67 0.49 0.47 0.44
Interest rate 0.65 0.47 0.47 0.48
Non-policy Cholesky In￿ ation 0.64 0.50 0.83 0.50
Output gap 0.57 0.50 0.91 0.50
Interest rate 0.68 0.50 0.90 0.50
Sign In￿ ation 0.47 0.49 0.67 0.45
Output gap 0.48 0.49 0.67 0.45
Interest rate 0.47 0.49 0.66 0.43
The table splits our experiments into four large panels. The columns de￿ne the conditions
under which the simulated data were generated: by good policy or good luck. The rows
de￿ne the counterfactuals: policy and non-policy respectively. Within each column we report
￿ detection probabilities￿for two subsamples. Subsample 1 is the period prior to the simulated
Great Moderations and subsample 2 is the remainder of each simulation. The detection
probabilities are simple the average values of the lines in the bottom rows of 5￿ 8 and 13￿ 16
and are reported for each variable under each of our two identi￿cation schemes.
Loosely speaking, if the TVP-VAR performs well in diagnosing the true cause of our
simulated Great Moderations, we would expect to see more marked di⁄erences in the detection
probabilities across subsamples for the ￿ on diagonal￿panels of the table. This is most clearly
the case when the shocks are identi￿ed using the Cholesky decomposition, which is unsurprising
given the discussions in previous subsections.
In summary, when the simulated data sets contain Great Moderations generated by a fall in
the variance of policy shocks, the TVC-VAR does well in recovering the source of the structural
change. This is particularly true when the shocks are identi￿ed using a Cholesky scheme. The
results from the sign restriction identi￿cation are more mixed. This is primarily because
under this identi￿cation scheme the estimated change in the volatility of the monetary policy
shock is smaller than under Cholesky identi￿cation. When the simulated data contain Great
Moderations generated by good luck, we again ￿nd that the TVC-VAR performs reasonably
33well in diagnosing the cause of the structural change. And again, these results depend, to
an extent, on the identi￿cation scheme used. When sign restrictions are used to identify the
monetary policy shocks, conclusions from the counterfactual experiments are less precise.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we construct simulated data from a New Keynesian model with learning for each
of two scenarios. The ￿rst scenario generates ￿ Great Moderations￿by reducing the variance
of monetary policy shocks (￿ good policy￿ ). The second scenario generates them by reducing
the variance of non-policy shocks (￿ good luck￿ ). We then ask if time-varying VAR models can
correctly identify the source of the Great Moderations in data sets from both scenarios. We
￿nd that, in general, they can. For example, in data sets with Great Moderations generated
by good policy, the VAR correctly identi￿es a downward shift in the policy disturbance. And
it shows that if the policy shocks associated with the latter part of the sample (during which
policy is conducted well) are applied to the earlier part of the sample, the implied variances
of output, in￿ ation and interest rates would have been much lower. Likewise, for data sets
generated by ￿ good luck￿ , the VAR correctly identi￿es a downward shift in the variance of non-
policy shocks. And counterfactual experiments correctly identify the role of non-policy shocks
in determining the changes in the variances of output, in￿ ation and interest rates observed in
the data sets.
An important caveat to our results is that they appear to be sensitive to the method used to
identify monetary policy shocks. When we use a Cholesky decomposition, the VAR provides
quite clear evidence in favour of the correct explanation for our simulated Great Moderations
When sign restrictions are used, however, the conclusions from the counterfactual experiments
are somewhat less precise.
Our results suggest that the e⁄ects of better monetary policy on expectations can be
correctly identi￿ed as ￿ good policy￿ by a time-varying VAR approach, when expectations
formation is described by adaptive learning. These results contrast with those of Benati
& Surico (2006), who ￿nd that, time-varying VARs are unable to correctly identify ￿ good
policy￿in data generated by a rational expectations model under the assumption that policy
changes from using an ￿ indeterminate￿policy rule to using a ￿ determinate￿rule. This suggests
that the ability or otherwise of time-varying VARs to identify the contributions to the Great
Moderation depends on the nature of the expectations and learning processes that characterise
private sector behaviour.
Since econometric analysis of actual data using time-varying parameter VAR models ￿such
as Benati & Mumtaz (2006) ￿suggests that the Great Moderation was generated by ￿ good
34luck￿ , how should we read our results? One interpretation is that they lead us to put less
weight on Bernanke￿ s scepticism about the ability of empirical tools to correctly diagnose the
Great Moderations caused by good policy. Bernanke argues that changes in the expectations
formation process caused by improvements in monetary policy may appear as ￿ good luck￿in
the data. We use a model with private sector learning so that changes in monetary policy
behaviour will have an e⁄ect on the economy via changes in the expectations formation process.
Even so, we ￿nd that appropriately identi￿ed time-vary parameter VARs are able to correctly
uncover the true source of Great Moderations simulated from this model.
Of couse, this leads us to another interpretation: our ￿ndings may lead us to put less weight
on the notion that the Great Moderation can be explained using a simple model with adaptive
learning. While the model incorporates plausible learning behaviour by private sector agents,
it is perhaps too stylised to replicate the patterns in time series data that characterise the
Great Moderations we observe in actual macroeconomic data. Given the extreme ￿ exibility of
the time-varying parameter VAR, one could argue that our Monte Carlo experiments generate
data that is ￿ easy￿for the econometric technique to analyse. One caveat, of course, is that
the results are sensitive to the way that economic structure is imposed on the VAR: that
is, the way that monetary policy shocks are identi￿ed. This suggests that more exotic data
generating mechanisms, for example models featuring switches in expectations behaviour such
as those analysed by Milani (2007) and Brazier et al. (2008) may prove a sterner test for the
time-varying VAR approach. We leave this conjecture for future work.
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37A Appendix: Priors and Estimation
A.1 Priors
Elements of ￿l;t
The starting value for ￿l;t is derived by estimating a ￿xed coe¢ cient VAR on the ￿rst 30
observations in each simulated dataset. The prior for the matrix Q (which essentially controls
time-variation ) is described below
Elements of Ht
Let ^ vols denote the OLS estimate of the VAR covariance matrix estimated on the pre-
sample data (￿rst 30 observations). The prior for the diagonal elements of the VAR covariance
matrix (see 9 ) is as follows:
lnh0 ￿ N(ln￿0;I3 ￿ 10)
where ￿0 are the diagonal elements of the cholesky decomposition of ^ vols:
Elements of At








where ^ aols are the o⁄ diagonal elements of ^ vols, with each row scaled by the corresponding
element on the diagonal. V
￿
^ aols￿
is assumed to be diagonal with the diagonal elements set
equal to 10 times the absolute value of the corresponding element of ^ aols:
Hyperparameters




where ￿ Q0 is assumed to be var(^ ￿
OLS
)￿10￿4￿3:5 and T0 is the length of the pre-sample used
for calibration.
The prior distribution for the blocks of S is inverse Wishart:
Si;0 s IW(￿ Si;Ki)
where i = 1::5 indexes the blocks of S: ￿ Si is calibrated using ^ aols. Speci￿cally, ￿ Si is a diagonal
matrix with the relevant elements of ^ aols multiplied by 10￿3:












38A.2 Simulating the Posterior Distributions
Time-Varying VAR coe¢ cients









where t = T ￿ 1;::1; ￿ denotes a vector that holds all the other VAR parameters and:
￿lTjT = E (￿lTjZt;￿)
PTjT = Cov (￿lTjZt;￿)
￿ltjt+1 = E (￿ltjZt;￿)
Ptjt+1 = Cov (￿ltjZt;￿)
As shown by Carter & Kohn (2004) the simulation proceeds as follows. First we use the
Kalman ￿lter to draw ￿lTjT and PTjT and then proceed backwards in time using:










Following Cogley & Sargent (2005), the diagonal elements of the VAR covariance matrix
are sampled using the methods described in Jacquier et al. (2004).
Element of At








where ~ Zt = Zt ￿
L X
l=1
￿l;tZt￿l = vt and V AR(ut) = Ht: This is a system of equations with
time-varying coe¢ cients and given a block diagonal form for V ar(￿t) the standard methods
for state space models described in Carter & Kohn (2004) can be applied.
VAR hyperparameters
Conditional on Zt, ￿l;t, Ht, and At, the innovations to ￿l;t, Ht, and At are observable,




As mentioned above, the total number of Gibbs sampling replications employed in each
monte carlo replication are limited to 20,000 in order to keep the experiment computationally
tractable. We assess convergence of the Gibbs sampler by constructing cumulative means of
the key model parameters over the retained draws.
Cumulative means of Gibbs draws.
The ￿gure above plots the average estimate of the cumulative means (i.e. averages over the
Monte-Carlo draws). The cumulative means are computed for the sequence of vectorised
TVC-VAR parameters over every 10 retained Gibbs draws. The ￿gure shows that there is
little ￿ uctuation in these mean estimates. This provides some evidence for convergence of the
Gibbs sampler (on average over the Monte-Carlo replications).
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Estimating insurance and incentive effects of
labour market reforms
Klaus Waelde (Glasgow)
Using time-varying VARs to diagnose the source
of 'Great Moderations': a Monte Carlo analysis
Tony Yates (Bank of England)
The Optimum Quantity of Money with Gold
Reserves
Max Gillman (Cardiff)
Managing Disinflation Under Uncertainty Eric Schaling (Pretoria)
Factor demand linkages and the business cycle:
interpreting aggregate fluctuations as sectoral
fluctuations
Sean Holly (Cambridge)
Monetary and Fiscal Rules in an Emerging
Small Open Economy
Paul Levine (Surrey) with joint with Nicoletta
Batini (IMF and Surrey) Joe Pearlman (London
Met)
Can a pure Real Business Cycle Model explain
the real exchange rate?
Patrick Minford (Cardiff)
Macroeconomic Implications of a Key Currency Matthew Canzoneri (Georgetown)
How we can model the credit crunch Peter Sinclair (Birmingham)
Sticky information versus efficient indexation Richard Mash (New College, Oxford
See also the CDMA Working Paper series at www.st-andrews.ac.uk/cdma/papers.html.